By Darren G. Hawkins, Visit Amazon's David A. Lake Page, search results, Learn about Author Central, David A. Lake, , Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney
Why do states delegate definite projects and tasks to foreign firms instead of performing unilaterally or cooperating without delay? moreover, to what quantity do states proceed to regulate IOs as soon as authority has been delegated? analyzing quite a few assorted associations together with the area alternate association, the United international locations and the eu fee, this booklet explores the various equipment that states hire to make sure their pursuits are being served, and identifies the issues concerned with tracking and dealing with IOs. The participants recommend that it isn't inherently more challenging to layout potent delegation mechanisms at foreign point than at family point and, drawing on principal-agent conception, aid clarify the differences that exist within the volume to which states are prepared to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, yet are greater understood as bureaucracies that may be managed to various levels via their political masters.
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Additional resources for Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)
If the principal must learn everything that the agent knows and observe everything the agent does, the gains from specialization diminish accordingly. At the extreme, with perfect knowledge and monitoring, it is almost as if the principal has performed the task herself. Thus, to the extent that specialization is part of the motivation for delegating to an agent, the agent can act opportunistically by failing to disclose actions or information that might be beneficial to the principal. Specialization also typically inhibits the principal’s ability to threaten contracting with other agents as a disciplining device to control the first agent.
Since revising the relationship will likely produce a policy change, the greater the preference heterogeneity of states the more likely one or more members will prefer the status quo to the proposed outcome. Depending on the rules for institutional decision-making, this may allow states to veto any proposed revision of the delegation relationship and, thus, give the agent more autonomy (in this volume see Cortell and Peterson, Thompson, and Martin). Institutional rules, power, and delegation In addition to their preferences over policy, states also care about how institutional rules at the international level aggregate national preferences into policy and control over possible IO agents.
In support of this argument, Hawkins and Jacoby argue that principals often delayed delegation to the ECHR while they tried to ascertain the Court’s preferences. Thompson argues that states delegated to the Security Council due to its heterogeneous preferences and the Council, in turn, failed to delegate enforcement to the United States due to concerns about US intentions. Martin finds evidence that states delegated more to the IMF when the staff’s preferences reflected those of the principals.